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RHETORICAL SLAVERY, RHETORICAL 
CITIZENSHIP 
Gerald L. Neuman* 
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION. By Judith N. 
Shklar. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1991. Pp. 23, 120. 
$17.95. 
Why vote? Why work? In this provocative little volume, Judith 
Shklar1 proposes linked answers to these seemingly disparate ques-
tions: when Americans vote and work, they exercise rights that mark 
their status as citizens. Shklar intends these answers, however, to be 
local rather than universal; she finds the American conception of citi-
zenship distinguished by its emphasis on equality of political rights 
and on earning one's living as the two key indicia of social standing. 
Shklar offers a historical explanation for this distinctive conception -
in a slaveholding democracy, voting and earning were activities that 
exhibited one's status as a free citizen. Ultimately, the analysis leads 
to a call for reform, as this conception "creates a presumption of a 
right to work as an element of American citizenship" (p. 99), which 
implies the government's obligation to ensure full employment for its 
citizens. 
Shklar writes partly in opposition to American scholars who base 
their theorizing on the political thought of the founding era.2 Her ac-
count of a dynamic citizenship, continually reshaped through the 
struggles of marginalized groups for inclusion, provides a valuable 
supplement to studies based in legal and elite political sources.3 It 
may be useful, nonetheless, to state some reservations about the histor-
ical argument, which the brevity of the book leaves unaddressed. 
More fundamentally, however, I will question Shklar's strategy of 
pursuing reform by enriching the conception of citizenship. If practi-
cally implemented, this strategy could have unintended exclusionary 
consequences, because many workers in the United States are not citi-
zens. By linking the rights to vote and to earn, Shklar has recast a 
• Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1973, Harvard; Ph.D. 1977, Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology; J.D. 1980, Harvard. - Ed. The author thanks C. Edwin Baker 
and Seth Kreimer for comments on an earlier draft. 
1. Professor of Government, Harvard University. 
2. Pp. 9-10. The example singled out for mixed praise and blame is Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond 
the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988). P. 105 n.6. 
3. See, e.g .• JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-
1870 (1978); PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CmZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: IL-
LEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985). 
1276 
May 1992] Rhetorical Citizenship 1277 
human right as a right of citizenship. The argument thus exhibits a 
blind spot all too common in political theory - inattention to the 
presence of aliens within the community. 
I 
American Citizenship is a slightly expanded version of Professor 
Shklar's 1989 Tanner Lectures of the same title.4 The two chapters on 
"Voting" and "Earning" are now preceded by an introduction whose 
content is largely methodological. Here Shklar contrasts the meaning 
of citizenship as social standing5 - what she sometimes calls "full" 
citizenship - with three other common interpretations of citizenship 
that do not figure in the inquiry. These bracketed interpretations are 
citizenship as mere nationality, the general normative standard of 
"good citizenship," and the particular ideal of dedication to civic life 
embodied in the classical republican vision of citizenship (pp. 3-12). 
The introduction also highlights the character of citizenship as a 
historically grounded, and therefore dynamic, notion. Shklar argues 
both that American citizenship was crucially influenced by the institu-
tion of slavery and that it has evolved further since emancipation: 
If these essays have any polemical purpose, it is not only to join those 
scholars who have belatedly come to recognize the part that slavery has 
played in our history. Important as that rethinking of our past is, I also 
want to remind political theorists that citizenship is not a notion that can 
be discussed intelligibly in a static and empty social space. . . . Citizen-
ship has changed over the years, and political theorists who ignore the 
best current history and political science cannot expect to have anything 
very significant to contribute to our political self-understanding. [p. 9] 
To determine the social meaning of American citizenship one should 
investigate the struggles of those women and men who were denied 
full citizenship. "Their voices . . . defined what was unique about 
American citizenship: voting and earning" (p. 15). 
The first chapter explores the tension between the American ideal 
of equality and the persistence of restrictive suffrage qualifications. 
Shklar recounts successive expansions of suffrage in America, where -
the visible presence of actual slavery reinforced the status anxiety of 
the disenfranchised. First the colonists, unrepresented in Parliament, 
fought for a government in which they would be represented, claiming 
that without representation they were little more than slaves (pp. 38-
42). Similar claims accompanied the struggle against property qualifi-
cations for voting, which scored many successes in the early nine-
4. See Judith Shklar, American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion, in XI THE TANNER 
LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 385 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 1990) [hereinafter TANNER 
LECTURES). 
5. Shklar explains that she employs the term standing in preference to the alternative status 
in order to avoid the pejorative associations the latter may evoke. P. 2. 
1278 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:1276 
teenth century (pp. 46-50). Less symbolic concerns about 
(re)enslavement motivated the Fifteenth Amendment's prohibition 
against racial qualifications (pp. 52-57). The continued denial of fe-
male suffrage was experienced as an insult to the status of white wo-
men, who had thereby "in one respect at least, shared the degrading 
lot of the slaves" (p. 61). 
At the same time, the history of women's suffrage confirms the 
primarily symbolic function of the franchise as a badge of citizenship. 
Women did not form a distinct political class, and in terms of practical 
results their enfranchisement was "the biggest non-event in our electo-
ral history" (pp. 60-61). For Shklar, the perceived civic significance of 
being a voter helps explain why later members of a group that had 
struggled to overcome exclusion from the electorate might not bother 
to cast votes once their standing was no longer in question (pp. 27-28). 
Parallel to standing in the political world is the citizen's standing 
in the social world and in the market, to which the second chapter 
turns. The model of the "independent citizen-earner" makes the 
American work ethic comprehensible "as the ideology of citizens 
caught between racist slavery and aristocratic pretensions" (p. 64). 
Jacksonian democracy made the dignity of labor a civic principle, but 
the coexistence of free labor and slave labor tended to bring physical 
work into contempt (pp. 72-81). This tension was only partly eased by 
the American dream of advancement from wage-earning to self-em-
ployment (pp. 64-65, 81-82). The industrial nightmare of "wage-slav-
ery" threatened more than just material deprivation; dependency 
might also reduce workers to the social position of slaves (pp. 79-81). 
Independent earning was, of course, also precious to those excluded 
from the free labor force: slaves and women. For feminists, the anal-
ogy between slaves and married women, even when the latter were 
forced into idleness, was compelling (pp. 83-87). 
The perceived civic significance of earning may explain why the 
work ethic in American culture persisted after hopes for meaningful 
work and social mobility had faded in the modern system of industrial 
labor (pp. 91-92). More poignantly, despite our allegiance to the work 
ethic, there is no guarantee that the citizen-worker will have any work 
to do (pp. 92-96). "The fears originally inspired by slavery, laced by 
racism and resentment of idleness at the top, were enhanced by the 
fear of being fired" (p. 92). The contradiction between the cult of 
earning and the specter of unemployment impels Shklar to press ex-
plicitly for reform: 
To reveal the unfulfilled promises of traditional ideologies is certainly 
not the only significant form of social criticism, nor is it usually the most 
appropriate. I have resorted to it here only because I think it important 
to recall not only the antiquity and continuing prevalence and relevance 
of the Jacksonian faith, but also the fact that it creates a presumption of 
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a right to work as an element of American citizenship, and that this 
ought to be recognized. [p. 99] 
The book thus ends with a prescription for which the ground has been 
carefully prepared. American citizenship should entail a right to earn, 
as well as a right to vote, lest our unemployed fellow citizens suffer 
"the loss of public respect, the reduction of standing and demotion to 
second-class citizenship" (p. 100). Shklar does not view this right as a 
universal moral right or a primary human right. Instead it is cultur-
ally grounded, "a right derived from the requirements of local citizen-
ship" (p. 100). 
II 
The central contribution of American Citizenship is its explication 
of the right to work as an "emblem of equal citizenship" (pp. 61-62) 
that developed in the United States in reaction to slavery. The strug-
gle for the right to vote is over, but the struggle for the right to earn 
continues (pp. 61-62). To the extent that the book seeks to emphasize 
the early acceptance of the dignity of labor in the United States, and 
the importance of self-support to social standing, it is highly 
persuasive. 
The book presents itself, however, as more than simply a selective 
investigation of two of many facets that contribute to first-class citi-
zenship in a modem capitalist democracy. The parallel treatment of 
voting and earning as badges of freedom is designed to reinforce the 
civic identification of the less conventional right. Shklar repeatedly 
ascribes a special fundamentality in American political thought to this 
pair of citizenship rights, and states that their prominence is distinc-
tive to citizenship in the United States. 6 She explains this prominence 
as resulting from the fact that voting and earning once distinguished 
freemen from slaves (pp. 1-2). Unfortunately, the lecture format does 
not afford sufficient space in which to demonstrate, rather than merely 
to suggest, that these two rights crucially characterize citizenship in 
the United States, or that their special status was caused by the juxta-
position with slavery. It falls to a reviewer, therefore, to mention some 
unallayed doubts about the accuracy of these stronger claims. 
Unquestionably the right to vote and the right to dispose of one's 
labor were highly prized, and were denied to slaves. 7 The same could 
be said, however, of many other highly prized rights. For example, 
slaves were denied the right to freedom of speech, the right to bear 
arms, the right to receive an education, and even the right of family 
6. E.g., pp. 3, 15. 
7. In some cases, slaves were permitted to dispose of their labor, but the permission was 
revocable and does not undercut Shklar's account. See EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, 
ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 391-94 (Vintage Books 1976) (1972). 
1280 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:1276 
members to live together. 8 Their right to bodily integrity was severely 
limited.9 Shklar does not discuss why these other rights should not be 
regarded as key attributes of citizenship, or how they failed to achieve 
this status. This logical objection cannot disprove her historical thesis, 
but it does highlight the need for specific evidence of the asserted 
causality. 
These doubts are not dispelled by the evidence that the threat of 
slavery was invoked in debates over suffrage and free labor. As Shklar 
explicitly recognizes, accusations of enslavement were also a tradi-
tional figure of political rhetoric transmitted to the colonies from Eng-
land (p. 39). Slavery was the correlative of tyranny, of any unjustified 
power. As Justice Mathews wrote, condemning arbitrary administra-
tive action in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 10 
the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the 
means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at 
the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where 
freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself. 11 
The colonists subjected to taxation without representation did com-
pare themselves to slaves, and vulnerable laborers did complain of 
wage-slavery.12 But similar accusations were made by the competitors 
of the New Orleans slaughterhouse monopoly, 13 and in support of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act. 14 To this day, we still hear arguments that 
taxation or conscription is slavery, from people whose social standing 
is in no danger. Then as now, those who argue that the absence of a 
particular right would be tantamount to slavery do not necessarily be-
lieve their own rhetoric, and do not necessarily prize the right because 
it was withheld from slaves rather than because of its direct material 
consequences.15 
8. See id. at 29-41. 
9. See id. at 33-40. In this regard it is interesting to note that the public whipping of white 
men was opposed in South Carolina because whipping "was the characteristic punishment for 
slaves," and thus its use on white lawbreakers threatened the racial hierarchy. MICHABL S. 
HINDUS, PRISON AND PLANTATION: CRIME, JUSTICE, AND AUTHORITY IN MASSACHUSBTI'S 
AND SOUTH CAROLINA, 1767-1878, at 101-02 (1980). 
10. 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (condemning discriminatory denial of consent to operate a laundry 
to a Chinese immigrant). 
11. 118 U.S. at 370. 
12. Pp. 39, 80. I do not mean to characterize the invocations of slavery by African Ameri-
cans after the Civil War as merely rhetorical. In their case, denial of the rights to vote, to testify 
against whites, to own weapons, and so on, really did form part of a systematic effort to reduce 
them to a captive labor force. See ERIC FONBR, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED 
REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at 198-210 (1988). 
13. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 49-51 (1873) (argument of coun-
sel) (claiming the monopoly violated the Thirteenth Amendment). 
14. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 83 (1911) (Harlan, J., concurring and 
dissenting) ("[T]he conviction was universal that the country was in real danger from another 
kind of slavery sought to be fastened on the American people."). 
15. Even as regards suffrage. Although a well-known collective action problem may dimin-
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Real slavery was a legal as well as a social status, defined by com-
prehensive disabilities. Shklar leaves such disabilities behind when the 
chapter on earning takes an unexpected turn. After showing the im-
portance of the dignity of labor in the nineteenth century, Shklar 
briefly adverts to the situation of "the middle-class feminists who came 
to resent being excluded from the world of gainful employment" (p. 
84). From this point, the discussion could have followed a route par-
allel to that of the voting chapter, and recounted the overturning of 
exclusions from the labor force. In other words, the quest for inclu-
sion could have been narrated as a history of the negative right to earn, 
involving a struggle against contractual incapacity, protective legisla-
tion, uncompensated domestic work, and unequal pay. Even for mid-
dle-class women, this struggle is not yet over. 
Instead, Shklar modulates from married women's forced idleness 
to an examination of unemployment in general and the dignity with-
held from all citizens who lack remunerated work. The chapter 
culminates in a brief for the positive right to work - not mere liberty 
of contract, but the obligation of government to guarantee full employ-
ment for its citizens, so that all who desire jobs can find them. (Here 
work figures as a noun, corresponding to the French droit au travail. 16) 
For Shklar, this is more than a right to livelihood, in the sense of 
transfer payments; citizens are entitled to an occupation that permits 
them to share in the dignity of labor and the social standing of the 
productively employed, and that offers them opportunity for advance-
ment (pp. 100-01). 
As Shklar recognizes, it is at first glance counterintuitive to derive 
a demand for government intervention to prevent forced idleness from 
the reaction against slavery, which was an avowedly paternalistic sys-
tem of forced labor (p. 94). The more obvious modem target for a 
critique based on the experience of slavery would be a system of 
"workfare" that compelled welfare recipients to perform in menial, 
dead-end jobs (p. 97), rather than a system of unemployment insur-
ance that provided adequate transfer payments but no work. Shklar's 
response is that, since the disappearance of actual slavery, the work 
ethic that formed as a contrast to slavery has acquired a different foil. 
"What [unemployed Americans] fear is welfare dependence, which 
has become the new focus of Jacksonian fears" (p. 96). 
If the dependent poor are now the disrespected other against which 
American citizenship defines itself through earning, one might wonder 
whether the dependent poor did or could serve that function irrespec-
tive of the existence of chattel slavery. In the late eighteenth and early 
ish an enfranchised individual's incentive to vote, there are evident practical dangers in belonging 
to a group that is known to be disenfranchised. 
16. This comparative observation is not gratuitous. See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying 
text. 
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nineteenth centuries, they were stigmatized under the label of "pau-
perism." The Articles of Confederation expressly withheld from 
"paupers" some of the benefits ofnationhood,17 and a similar interpre-
tation prevailed under the Constitution.18 In numerous states, wage-
earners' opposition to property qualifications for voting did not lead to 
universal manhood suffrage, but rather to the substitution of express 
disqualifications of paupers or tax payment qualifications barring the 
destitute, or both.19 There is thus some reason to believe that paupers 
had always exemplified second-class citizenship, and a closer compara-
tive study of attitudes in England (whence the American states derived 
many of their poor laws) might illuminate whether slavery was a nec-
essary factor in developing the American conception of the self-sup-
porting citizen. 
These doubts about the causative role of slavery gain significance 
in view of the rhetorical role slavery plays in American Citizenship 
itself. Here slavery figures as a distinctively American experience -
"it was this juxtaposition of slavery and constitutional democracy, 
above all else, that set America apart from other modem states" (pp. 
28-29). The linking of slavery and earning therefore provides a native 
pedigree for the positive right to work. To recognize the importance 
of this move, one need only recall that the articulation of a positive 
right to work is usually traced to France, and particularly to the 
revolution of 1848.20 This droit au travail is now one of the aspira-
tional rights of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.21 It is often argued that the economic and social 
rights of the Covenant are out of harmony with the W estem liberal 
tradition, which envisions negative rights against government oppres-
17. See ART. OF CoNFEDERATION art. IV (''The better to secure and perpetuate mutunl 
friendship and intercourse among the people of the different states in this Union, the free inhabit· 
ants of each of these states, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be enti· 
tied to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states •••• ")(emphasis added). 
18. See Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11Pet.)102 (1837), in which Justice Barbour 
wrote: 
We think it as competent and as necessary for a state to provide precautionary measures 
against the moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly convicts; as it is to guard 
against the physical pestilence, which may arise from unsound and infectious articles im· 
ported, or from a ship, the crew of which may oo laboring under an infectious disease. 
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 142-43. But see Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (finally rejecting 
this approach). 
19. On this trend, which Shklar's chapter on. voting ignores, see Robert J. Steinfeld, Property 
and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1989). 
20. See ROGER PRICE, THE FRENCH SECOND REPUBLIC: A SOCIAL HISTORY 105-09 
(1972); Bob Hepple, A Right to Work?, IO INDUS. L.J. 65, 71-72 (1981); see also Jon Elster, Is 
There (or Should There Be) a Right to Work?, in DEMOCRACY AND THE WELFARE STATE 53, 53 
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1988) (cited at p. 114 n.52) (the "droit au travail was the battle cry of the 
workers in the French Revolution of 1848."). 
21. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signa· 
ture December 19, 1966, art. 6, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6. 
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sion rather than positive rights to government services.22 Thus, Amer-
ican Citizenship might best be understood as an act of naturalization, 
an attempt to find roots outside the European socialist tradition for the 
positive right to work. Shklar may have been prescient in employing 
this strategy, given the current fashion for declaring the extinction of 
socialism.23 Sympathetic readers may be unsure, however, whether 
the attempt succeeds as history. 
III 
Though it may be somewhat daring to assert that the right to work 
is distinctively American, still I am less troubled by this claim than by 
the effort to make the right to work an attribute of American citizen-
ship. Shklar employs the language of citizenship in a manner not un-
common in political philosophy, seeking to fortify a claim of right by 
stressing the citizenship of the rightholders. As often, this seems to be 
done without attention to the implications of the argument for nonci-
tizens. By construing the activity of earning as a major defining char-
acteristic in a thick conception of citizenship, the argument sacrifices 
the noncitizen's rights to earn (both positive and negative) for the pur-
pose of enhancing the positive right to earn of the citizen. The book 
thus provides an appropriate occasion for a plea against the overuse of 
the rhetoric of citizenship. 
As Shklar points out in her introduction, the term citizenship has 
had a variety of meanings in American history (p. 3). The same could 
be said of its uses in political philosophy. Citizenship can serve simply 
as an evocative label for elements of a model - the theorist imagines a 
state in isolation from all other states, and refers to all the individuals 
in the model as its citizens. The theorist may not then investigate 
which of the claims of the individuals against the state require the 
special resonance of citizenship and which are sufficiently grounded in 
the individuals' humanity.24 Alternatively, the theorist can narrow 
the focus to a democratic state, and refer to the individuals as citizens 
to emphasize their entitlement to political participation. The theorist 
may then connect their moral claims to this entitlement. 25 
There is also a more sociological tradition of political thought that 
explores the features that constitute a preferred status for some mem-
bers of a society, a status that can be called full or first-class citizen-
22. See, e.g., MAURICE CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? 65-77 (1973). 
23. The lectures were originally given in May 1989. 
24. The Dworkin essay, discussed infra text accompanying note 30, illustrates this phenome-
non. See Ronald Dworkin, Foundations of Liberal Equality, in TANNER LECTURES, supra note 
4, at 1. 
25. AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1987), discussed infra text accompanying 
notes 38-41, illustrates this phenomenon. · 
1284 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:1276 
ship.26 Investigations of the attributes of such citizenship may be 
descriptive, or they may expressly draw prescriptive conclusions, as 
Shklar does here, reinforcing moral claims by associating them with 
citizenship. Although Shklar's introduction clarifies her intention to 
discuss citizenship as social standing, which she describes as "a vague 
notion, implying a sense of one's place in a hierarchical society" (p. 2), 
that choice does not mean that her concept of citizenship is inclusive 
enough to cover high-status foreign nationals. This is clear, for exam-
ple, from her attitude toward alien suffrage: she mentions that resi-
dent aliens once had full voting rights in many states, and no longer 
do, but this observation does not detract from her confidence that suf-
frage is now universal.27 Shklar's focus is on the difference between 
first- and second-class citizenship, both of which presuppose American 
nationality. 
I do not deny that there are some duties that a state owes first, or 
only, to its own citizens.28 It owes other duties to its residents of 
whatever nationality; still other duties to all persons within its terri-
tory, for whatever duration; and some, perhaps contingent, duties to 
all of humanity. International human rights treaties often obligate 
states to all persons within their jurisdiction. 29 
It is nonetheless common for political theorists to limit their atten-
tion to citizens, and to leave unaddressed the state's responsibilities to 
noncitizens within its territory. The authors may then formulate con-
clusions that, if taken literally, would have serious negative conse-
quences for those who are not citizens. For example, in the same 
volume of the Tanner Lectures in which the original version of 
Shklar's work appears, we find Ronald Dworkin describing as "a fun-
damental, almost defining, tenet of liberalism that the government of a 
political community should be tolerant of the different and often an-
tagonistic convictions its citizens have about the right way to live."30 
26. An influential example is T.H. Marshall's lecture Citizenship and Social Class (1949), in 
T.H. MARSHALL, CI.Ass, CmzENSHIP AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 65 (Greenwood 1973) 
(1964). 
27. Pp. 4-5, 38, 61-62. Similarly, she invokes as evidence legal texts where citizenship implies 
nationality. Pp. 15, 33-35. 
28. I would agree, for example, that a state with defensible naturalization policies may limit 
voting rights to its own citizens. (I am treating citizens and nationals as synonyms, although 
their meanings may diverge when used as terms of art in particular disciplines.) 
29. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature De-
cember 19, 1966, art. 2(1), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173 ("all individuals within its territory and subject 
to its jurisdiction"); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, opened for signature November 4, 1950, art. 1, Europ. T.S. No. 5 ("everyone within their 
jurisdiction"); American Convention on Human Rights, November 22, 1969, art. 1(1), Org. Arn. 
States T.S. No. 36 ("all persons subject to their jurisdiction"). But see International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 21, art. 2(3) ("Developing countries, with due 
regard to human rights and their national economy, may determine to what extent they would 
guarantee the economic rights recognized in the present Covenant to non-nationals.") (emphasis 
added). 
30. Dworkin, supra note 24, at 4 (emphasis added). 
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This phrasing comes very close to implying the acceptability of intol-
erance toward convictions that are held by noncitizens but are not 
shared by citizens, an attitude that in the past has supported discrimi-
nation against "heathen Chinese" and the exclusion of foreigners hold-
ing "un-American" political views. 
Such ambiguities might appear harmless if they did not feed into 
ambiguities in the legal system. The drafting of the Bill of Rights also 
reflected inattention to the position of aliens, and the infamous Alien 
Act of 1798 prompted a vehement debate over whether aliens had con-
stitutional rights at all.31 Xenophobic Federalists drew support in that 
debate from an interpretation of the social contract tradition as afford-
ing rights only to the "parties" to the social contract, i.e., citizens. 32 
The absolute version of this argument has been rejected, but more spe-
cific attempts to narrow the reach of constitutional provisions have 
continued. Most recently, a four-Justice plurality of the Supreme 
Court read the Fourth Amendment's declaration of "[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects" as 
excluding those aliens who are present on American soil but are not 
part of the "people of the United States."33 
In recognition of the political powerlessness of resident aliens and 
the long history of discrimination against them, the Burger Court de-
veloped an equal protection doctrine treating alienage as a suspect 
classification.34 Justice Rehnquist, however, consistently dissented 
from this approach, arguing that the Constitution's legitimation of dis-
crimination against aliens in the sphere of political rights demon-
strated that discrimination against aliens could not be constitutionally 
suspect. 35 He regarded it as "natural" for the state to reserve limited 
resources for its present and future citizens. 36 It is uncertain whether 
Chief Justice Rehnquist will someday have the votes to overturn this 
line of cases, and to remit the unenumerated rights of aliens to legisla-
tive discretion. 
Political philosophers who rely heavily on the characteristics of 
citizenship in justifying a given right may even supply a rationale for 
withholding that right from aliens. This mode of argument can sug-
31. I discuss this episode in Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 
927-38 (1991). 
32. See id. at 929-32. 
33. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (quoting 
U.S. CoNST. amend. IV, pmbl.). A fifth Justice concurred in the opinion but disassociated him-
self from this part of the argument. See 494 U.S. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
34. See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 20-23 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Graham v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971). 
35. See, e.g., Toll, 458 U.S. at 39-42 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Sugarman v. Dougall, 
413 U.S. 634, 651-52 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The most recent case was Bernal v. 
Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984), in which Justice Rehnquist noted his lone dissent, 467 U.S. at 228. 
36. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. l, 21 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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gest that the reliance was necessary, and that noncitizens could not 
assert the right, or that noncitizens' interests must be subordinated to 
avoid diluting the opportunities of citizens. For example, some cham-
pions of the right to education have placed great weight on the contri-
bution that education makes to the exercise of fundamental rights of 
political participation.37 A similar linkage animates Amy Gutmann's 
Democratic Education, in which the author derives a broad range of 
constraints on educational policy from the proposition that the central 
purpose of education in a liberal democracy is to prepare children in 
their capacity as future citizens for deliberative participation in the 
polity.38 Gutmann deemphasizes the role of education in preparing 
children for survival in the marketplace, 39 and consistently describes 
public education as a process in which citizen teachers, overseen by a 
government elected by citizens, train the children of citizen parents. 
This rhetoric could lead to the conclusion that alien children have 
no place in the schools of a democracy.40 Gutmann discusses a 
number of Supreme Court decisions, but gives no attention to the 
Texas alien children's case, Plyler v. Doe. 41 In that case, the state of 
Texas argued that the exclusion of undocumented alien children from 
the political community justified denying them an education alto-
gether. 42 Justice Brennan's opinion for a carefully balanced majority 
of five rejected the state's argument on a number of grounds. He 
noted the possibility that even undocumented alien children might 
someday become citizens,43 but further observed that "education pro-
vides the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically 
productive lives," and that educational deprivation would promote 
"the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within our 
boundaries, surely adding to the problems and costs of unemployment, 
welfare, and crime."44 On Brennan's view, the role of education in 
training future workers and consumers, and future addressees of the 
laws, also constrains the democratic distribution of education. 
37. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 113-15 (1973) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). 
38. See GUTMANN, supra note 25, at 13-14. 
39. Id. at 147-48. 
40. Gutmann herself probably would not endorse such a conclusion, since in a Inter essay she 
has acknowledged inattention to alien residents as a "blind spot" in conventional political theory. 
See Amy Gutmann, Introduction, in DEMOCRACY AND TIIE WELFARE STATE, supra note 20, at 
3, II. 
41. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). Nor does she mention Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (inval-
idating exclusion of aliens who did not intend to become citizens from university scholarship 
program), or Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (upholding exclusion of aliens who did not 
intend to become citizens from employment as public school teachers). 
42. 457 U.S. at 222 n.20, 229-30. New York had earlier made a similar argument for deny-
ing financial aid to resident alien college students who did not intend to naturalize. Nyquist v. 
Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1977). 
43. 457 U.S. at 222 n.20, 230. 
44. 457 U.S. at 221, 230. 
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The potentially misleading democratic pedigree of a right to educa-
tion is paralleled by a democratic pedigree for the right to work. 
Rights to economic self-sufficiency have been derived as a guarantee 
needed to ensure every citizen the material preconditions of political 
participation.45 This argument inverts the classical republican argu-
ment for disenfranchisement of the dependent into an instrumental ar-
gument for the right to a livelihood. Again, it could be concluded that 
a derived right to work is a right of citizenship, not a human right. 
Shklar's argument for the right to work has a different logical 
structure, but a similar rhetorical thrust. , Shklar links the right to vote 
and the right to earn as historically associated indicia of the dignity of 
citizens in our national version of democracy. The. argument tells us 
that an American's negative and positive rights to earn deserve protec-
tion because the public ethos demotes nonearning citizens to second-
class citizenship. This does not inevitably imply that a noncitizen's 
rights to earn are as insubstantial as her right to vote, but it does indi-
cate that they lack the most salient rationale. 
Moreover, one way to address the unemployment problems of citi-
zens is to subordinate the employment rights of aliens to those of citi-
zens. American labor has understood this point. For example, the 
electorate of Arizona responded to a depression in 1914 by approving 
an initiative measure "to protect the citizens of the United States in 
their employment against non-citizens of the United States" by cap-
ping at twenty percent the percentage of aliens permitted in the 
workforce of any employer with more than five employees.46 
This Arizona statute became the occasion for a major precedent on 
the alien's negative right to work. The Supreme Court struck it down 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
Truax v. Raich, emphasizing that "the right to work for a living in the 
common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the 
personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the 
Amendment to secure."47 The Court also observed that denying 
aliens the opportunity to earn a livelihood would be tantamount to 
denying them "entrance and abode," thus infringing the exclusive 
power over immigration vested in the federal government. 48 
45. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal 
Entitlements, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 37 (1990); Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a 
Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659, 677-78. 
46. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); see also JoHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN ,THE 
LAND: PATIERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860-1925, at 183 (2d ed. 1963) (attributing the 
initiative to the State Federation of Labor). The quotation in the text comes from the statute's 
title; the 20% cap included not only aliens but also anyone else who was neither a native-born 
citizen nor a qualified elector. 239 U.S. at 35. 
47. 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915). The plaintiff Mike Raich was an Austrian national and worked 
as a cook in a restaurant. 
48. 239 U.S. at 41-42. 
1288 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:1276 
Truax v. Raich was confirmed and extended in later decisions. 
Some of these cases distinguish between public sector employment, 
where certain ''jobs" have the character of political offices, and private 
sector employment. 49 Justice Rehnquist, of course, has disagreed, 
concluding that states could bar aliens from private professions such 
as law and engineering, as well as from the full range of public 
employment. so 
Significantly, Truax v. Raich also illustrates the Court's assump-
tion that government power over aliens' access to the U.S. labor mar-
ket derives from government power over aliens' access to U.S. 
territory, not vice versa. The peculiar character of immigration law 
within the American constitutional system relates not to some pri-
macy oflabor law, but rather to notions of the sovereignty of the terri-
torial nation-state and its right to regulate the presence of aliens within 
its borders.51 In the late nineteenth century this sovereignty was ar-
ticulated as a power both to exclude and to prescribe the conditions on 
which the alien could enter. 52 The power to set conditions regarding 
the alien's access to employment is not broader or more basic than the 
power to set conditions regarding the alien's consumption, investment, 
or travel. 
In reality as in legal doctrine, admission and exclusion of aliens 
involves more than just labor market policy. Some immigrants are 
motivated by family ties. Others are refugees fleeing persecution in 
their homelands; or, while not technically refugees, they seek a freer 
political climate or a more tolerant culture. Some limits on immigra-
tion do reflect labor protection, but others involve considerations of 
public health, national security, or prevention of drug-related crime. 
Numerical limitations also reflect a concern that cultural change 
should not proceed so rapidly as to destabilize American society. 
The rights afforded to aliens depend in part on their immigration 
status. American immigration law distinguishes between aliens admit-
ted temporarily for limited purposes and aliens admitted with the 
prospect of residing indefinitely.53 Once aliens have been permitted to 
center their lives in the United States, their need to work here rests on 
most of the same reasons as apply to citizens. They need to eat, and 
they need to support their families. They need money to participate in 
American society. They may need to maintain their human capital. 
49. See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Solido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 
634 (1973). 
50. See Examining Bd. of Engrs., Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 
609 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649 (1973) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
51. See Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 1, 5-
7 (1984). 
52. See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). 
53. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (1988) (defining immigrant and nonimmigrant categories). 
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They need self-respect and control of their fates. (This may be a prob-
lem for refugees especially.) Ideally, productive work can contribute 
structure and meaning to life. Perhaps employment will not provide 
aliens with a civic position equal to that of working citizens, but the 
other benefits sufficiently justify affording them broad occupational 
freedom, as the United States has traditionally done. 
Nonetheless, under current law an alien resident's right to work is 
not always secure. Since 1986, the imposition of comprehensive em-
ployer sanctions as a supplementary tool of immigration enforcement 
has increased the practical threats to aliens' exercise of their right to 
work. One danger comes from employers, who sometimes respond to 
the risk of liability for hiring unauthorized aliens by avoiding alien 
employees altogether.s4 Statutory antidiscrimination provisions partly 
counterbalance this danger, but Congress chose to protect only aliens 
who intend to naturalize against alienage discrimination. ss 
Another danger comes from the bureaucracy, because sanctions on 
employers make aliens' right to work dependent on documentary 
proof of employment authorization provided by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, an agency proverbial for delay and disre-
spect. s6 The problem is exemplified by recent litigation over such INS 
practices as giving interim replacement documentation to permanent 
residents whose cards have been lost or stolen that falsely portrays 
their status as temporary, and "lifting" the documentation of perma-
nent residents whom the INS accuses of being deportable. s7 Fortu-
nately, the courts have thus far recognized the seriousness of the 
injury imposed by even temporary deprivation of an alien's ability to 
work.ss 
American Citizenship would be a vehicle for regression, not reform, 
if the importance of alien residents' right to work were called into 
question by the characterization of earning as a distinctive attribute of 
S4. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CoNGRESS, IMMIGRATION RE-
FORM: EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION 38-43 (1990). 
SS. For the complex definition of the class of "protected individuals," see 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324b(a)(3)(B) (1990). This restriction may be mitigated in practical terms by the likelihood 
that the employer will have no way of knowing whether the alien is a "protected individual" or 
not. 
S6. See, e.g., U.S. CoMMN. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR: CIVIL 
RIGHTS lssUES IN IMMIGRATION 31-37 (1980) (noting inefficiency and hostility of INS repre-
sentatives); U.S. SELECT CoMMN. ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRA-
TION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, FINAL REPORT 238-44 (1981) (recommending 
improvements in INS operations); Bill Ong Hing, Estoppel in Immigration Proceedings - New 
Life From Akbarin and Miranda, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 11, 19 (1982) ("The INS has always 
been notorious for its lengthy delays in processing petitions and applications."). 
S1. See Etuk v. Slattery, 936 F.2d 1433 (2d Cir. 1991). 
S8. See Etuk, 936 F.2d at 1447, and the cases involving the INS's implementation of its 
regulations on employment authorization for asylum applicants. Ramos v. Thornburgh, 732 F. 
Supp. 696, 699-700 (E.D. Tex. 1989); Alfaro-Orellana v. Ilchert, 720 F. Supp. 792, 798 (N.D.Cal. 
1989); Doe v. Meese, 690 F. Supp. 1S72, 1S77 (S.D. Tex. 1988). 
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citizenship in the United States. I assume that Professor Shklar did 
not intend this result when she adopted the rhetoric of citizenship as a 
weapon against unemployment. No doubt it would be unduly alarmist 
to suggest that a single volume of political philosophy, even by so 
respected an author, could have such a strong unintended effect. 
Still, her invocation of citizenship follows a pervasive and troub-
ling habit in political theory. A philosophical culture that concen-
trates needlessly on citizens can influence public political discourse 
and the legal culture. I do not mean to criticize or discourage deliber-
ate investigation of the differences between citizens and aliens - in-
deed, I engage in it myself. But I do plead for more caution in 
resorting to the rhetoric of citizenship, on occasions when the rhetoric 
of humanity may suffice. 
